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What nervous systems do: early
evolution, input–output, and the skin
brain thesis
Fred Keijzer1, Marc van Duijn1 and Pamela Lyon2
Abstract
Nervous systems are standardly interpreted as information processing input–output devices. They receive environmental
information from their sensors as input, subsequently process or adjust this information, and use the result to control
effectors, providing output. Through-conducting activity is here the key organizational feature of nervous systems. In this
paper, we argue that this input–output interpretation is not the most fundamental feature of nervous system organiza-
tion. Building on biological work on the early evolution of nervous systems, we provide an alternative proposal: the skin
brain thesis (SBT). The SBT postulates that early nervous systems evolved to organize a new multicellular effector: mus-
cle tissue, the primary source of animal motility. Early nervous systems provided a new way of inducing and coordinating
self-organized contractile activity across an extensive muscle surface underneath the skin. The main connectivity in such
nervous systems runs across a spread out effector and is transverse to sensor-effector signaling. The SBT therefore con-
stitutes a fundamental conceptual shift in understanding both nervous system operation and what nervous systems are.
Nervous systems are foremost spatial organizers that turn large multi-cellular animal bodies into dynamic self-moving
units. At the end, we briefly discuss some theoretical connections to central issues within the behavioral, cognitive and
neurosciences.
Keywords
Nervous systems, nerve nets, early evolution, excitable media, embodied cognition
1 Introduction
Asking what nervous systems do may seem superflu-
ous: nervous systems conduct information from sensors
to effectors and process it in between. This interpreta-
tion seems beyond dispute, requiring no further
clarification or reflection. Witness various opening
statements in recent texts on the evolution of nervous
systems:
Brains are informed by the senses about the presence of
resources and hazards; they evaluate and store this input
and generate adaptive responses executed by the muscles.
(Allman, 1999, p. 2–3)
Nervous systems enable organisms to receive sensory
information from their external environment, process this
information and regulate neurosecretory and motor sys-
tems. (Je´kely, 2011, p. 914)
The function of the nervous system is to sense and relay
fast information about surroundings. The network struc-
ture of neurons serves rapid signal transmission between
sensory cells and a distant unit of specific cells, such as
muscle. (Watanabe, Fujisawa, & Holstein, 2009, p. 167)
These are claims about what nervous systems do at
their most basic level. The view that nervous systems
transmit information from sensors, process it in some
way and use the result to regulate effectors not only is
generally accepted in the literature on the evolution of
nervous systems, but also provides the consensus text-
book interpretation of what nervous systems do for
basically all of the neurosciences and the cognitive
sciences. The notion of information processing itself
goes back to Shannon, and has been used in close
connection with concepts like computation and repre-
sentation, implying that brains and nervous systems are
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computational devices at a basic level (e.g., Boden,
2006). However, very often the term is used in a very
loose and unspecified way and here we will focus on
the input–output aspects of the information processing
interpretation.
Under this input–output interpretation, nervous sys-
tems are fundamentally through-conducting devices
that process information. In the limiting case, this can
be as simple as a set of direct connections such as exem-
plified in the well-known Braitenberg vehicles (Figure
1): artificial creatures that react to their environment in
complex ways because of the specific wiring of connec-
tions between suitably placed sensors and effectors
(Braitenberg, 1984). The classic three-component reflex
arc—consisting of receptors, conductors, and
effectors—is another case where the connection is
thought of as being direct. In the case of the human
brain, the conductor part expands into high-level cog-
nition and consciousness. Still, despite the intricacies of
the central organizational architecture of nervous sys-
tems, through-conducting remains the conceptual foun-
dation on which these elaborations are built.
In this paper, we will examine and challenge this
textbook interpretation of nervous system operation by
turning to the earliest evolution of nervous systems. We
will argue that the input–output interpretation is
primarily fitted to describe relatively complex centra-
lized nervous systems. It does less well as a characteri-
zation of the most primitive nervous systems—diffusely
connected nerve nets—or as an account of the evolu-
tionary origins of these nerve nets. We will review evi-
dence and theoretical work from biology, which
suggests that a through-conducting set-up is not a pri-
mitive feature of these early nervous systems. We claim
that through-conduction, where and to the extent it is
an accurate description of some nervous system activ-
ity, is a later evolutionary development built upon ear-
lier features.
In contrast to the input–output view, we develop an
alternative proposal that stresses the fundamental coor-
dination problems faced by multicellular animals that
first developed movement by muscle contraction. This
form of motility required the patterned activation of
extended muscle sheets dispersed over the body. We
hold that the fundamental problem here was not so
much to act intelligently—a problem that had already
been solved in various ways without a nervous system
(Section 3.3)—but to act as a single multicellular unit.
In this story, nervous systems did not evolve initially to
provide a more efficient information processing device.
Nervous systems arose as a source and coordinator of
patterned activity across extensive areas of contractile
tissue in a way that was only loosely constrained by
sensor activity.
In this view, the central direction of nervous system
connections runs transverse—at right angles—to the
through-conducting stream that runs between sensors
and effectors: early nervous systems evolved as connec-
tions across a contractile tissue and in close connection
to the animal epithelium or skin. In this paper, we will
focus on the simplest case where the two are combined
in a myoepithelium, an epithelium that also has contrac-
tile (myoid) properties, and which is regularly named
as a potential nervous system precursor (Arendt, 2008;
Lichtneckert & Reichert, 2007; Mackie, 1970; Miller,
2009). Adopting the phrase ‘‘skin brain’’ introduced by
Holland (2003), we will refer to this idea as the skin
brain thesis, or SBT.
Before we develop our argument for the SBT, we
want to stress three general points. First, the SBT does
not deny the necessity of a link between sensory cells
and the activity across a myoepithelium. We also do
not deny the conceptual possibility of interpreting nerve
nets in input–output terms. The point made is that this
sensory connection is comparatively weak compared
with the reciprocal connections across a myoepithelium,
and that these latter, transverse connections are essen-
tial to understand both why nerve nets first evolved and
how they operate. Most especially, we claim that a skin
brain interpretation helps to explain what basic forms
of nervous systems do in a way that input–output inter-
pretations do not.
Figure 1. A Braitenberg vehicle is a little cart with two light
sensitive sensors directly connected ipsilaterally to two motors
driving the vehicle. This configuration makes the vehicle drive
towards the light.
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Second, we want to stress that the aim of the present
paper is conceptual. The SBT is a proposal for an alter-
native empirical interpretation of how basic nervous
systems work. Our main goal is to make it a matter of
further empirical investigation whether basic nervous
systems are best understood in terms of input–output
devices or as skin brains. Given the general consensus
that the input–output interpretation provides the foun-
dation of what nervous systems do, challenging this
interpretation for these basic cases sets up a major
research challenge that needs to be, and can be tackled
by further modeling studies and neurobehavioral
research on these systems. This is work that still needs
to be done. Here, we merely aim to make this option
thinkable, and to provide it with sufficient initial
plausibility.
The third point concerns the domain of the SBT.
The focus of the present paper is strictly on the evolu-
tion of the first nervous systems. The argument does
not directly implicate more complex centralized ner-
vous systems, and leaves open the possibility that after
an initial skin brain starting point, later nervous sys-
tems evolved further into definite input–output devices.
However, justification of the SBT as a serious account
of the operation of the most basic kinds of nervous sys-
tems, should provide a potent incentive for scrutinizing
the input–output interpretation for more complex ner-
vous systems. The idea that centralized nervous systems
are remodeled skin brains becomes a coherent theoreti-
cal and empirical option. Thus, while the present dis-
cussion remains limited to a very basic domain, there
are important potential connections with more complex
cases, some of which we will sketch in the final section.
Nevertheless, we want to stress that the immediate and
important challenge is to develop the SBT for the basic
case. Challenging the input–output consensus here is
challenging enough.
The text has the following structure. In the next sec-
tion, we will advance a working definition of nervous
systems, and provide the most basic extant example
nerve nets, such as those found in modern cnidarians
like jellyfish. In Section 3, we discuss some general rea-
sons for being critical about the input–output interpre-
tation of nervous systems. Rather than disqualifying
this interpretation, we aim to highlight some problema-
tical sides and provide initial credibility for seeking
alternative options. Section 4 introduces the key pro-
posal of Carl Pantin, who argued that muscle coordina-
tion was the basic reason for the evolution of early
nervous systems. Together, Sections 2–4 also provide a
list of 11 clues that act as constraints on the SBT as
developed in Section 5. In a concluding section, we
return to the differences with the input–output inter-
pretation, and give a short indication of potential wider
implications.
2 What are nervous systems?
While the brain is a prominent anatomical part of the
human body that cannot easily be overlooked, the situa-
tion is less clear when one turns to basic forms of ner-
vous systems. Interestingly, the notion of a nervous
system itself is less clear-cut than one might expect.
Conductive tissues—tissues that conduct signals—are
widespread inside and outside the animal kingdom
(Mackie, 1970), and it is often difficult to differentiate
‘‘genuine’’ nervous systems from these other forms of
conductive tissues. For example, certain sponges have a
conducting system consisting of a syncytium, a collection
of cells which are connected by their cytoplasm (Leys &
Meech, 2006), while plants also use action potentials for
signaling (Balusˇka, Mancuso, & Volkmann, 2006).
What differentiates nervous systems from other con-
ducting tissues? In their classic work Structure and
Function in the Nervous Systems of Invertebrates,
Bullock and Horridge defined nervous systems in terms
of their constituents: neurons.
A nervous system may be defined as an organized constel-
lation of cells (neurons) specialized for the repeated con-
duction of an excited state from receptor sites or from
other neurons to effectors or to other neurons. (Bullock &
Horridge, 1965, p. 6)
Bullock and Horridge’s definition provided anatomical
and physiological criteria to decide whether a nervous
system is present in a specific group or phylum. In
keeping with the neuron doctrine, they assumed that
neurons are cells specialized for conducting electrical
activity across their cell bodies and processes, which
are connected to other cells through dynamically polar-
ized (chemical) synapses and that conducting activity
flowed in one direction, from dendrites to axon (e.g.,
Guillery, 2007). Note, however, that this pragmatic def-
inition does not specify in what way nervous systems
are functionally different from other conducting sys-
tems, apart from the specifics of their constituents.
There is no system-based differentiation from other
conductive tissues.
Bullock and Horridge’s definition is now widely
accepted. Lichtneckert and Reichert in their review of
work on nervous system evolution also subscribe to the
same definition, only adding that the ability to generate
activity endogenously must also be part of the definition
(2007, p. 291), as this is now known as a common fea-
ture of nervous systems.
The most primitive forms of nervous systems still in
existence can be found in cnidarians (e.g., jellyfish).
Large parts of these nervous systems consist of dis-
persed and diffusely connected nerve nets while centra-
lization in ‘‘brain-like’’ structures or ganglia remains
limited (Figure 2). Activation can be passed on in any
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direction across the net. For a definition of these nerve
nets, we return to Bullock and Horridge:
A nerve net is a system of functionally connected nerve cells
and fibers anatomically dispersed through some consider-
able portion of an animal and so arranged as to permit dif-
fuse conduction of nervous excitation, that is, in relatively
direct paths between many points. The paths, as opposed
to indirect routing through a distant ganglion or central
structure, are multiple (Bullock & Horridge, 1965, p. 460)
In nerve nets, there are no—or at least few—clear tracts
of neurons to conduct activity from one specific point
to another. Instead, nervous activity can travel from
any arbitrary spot to any other point in the net.
Two caveats are necessary. First, note that the dif-
fuse character of how activity spreads across nerve nets
derives from connections at the system level, and is fully
compatible with the neuron doctrine (Mackie, 1987).
Second, while nerve nets are generally considered the
most primitive form that nervous systems can take
(e.g., Brusca & Brusca, 2003), whether the nerve nets of
modern cnidarians should be described as complete ner-
vous systems is now disputed (Grimmelikhuijzen, 1985;
Mackie, 2004b; Satterlie, 2011). Cnidarians exhibit vari-
ous forms of neural centralization, and can be said to
have centralized nervous systems. Satterlie (2011) spe-
cifically argues that the nerve net part may well be a sec-
ondary adaptation to the cnidarian body plan.
Nevertheless, nerve nets remain arguably the most
suitable candidate as the most primitive condition of
nervous systems. First, while modern nerve nets could
be a secondary adaptation, at present this is a mere pos-
sibility. It remains a good working assumption that sim-
ple, undifferentiated nerve nets are a basic form that
later became more differentiated rather than the other
way round. In addition, the events leading to the origins
of the first neurons and nervous systems can plausibly
be presumed to have taken place fairly deep in the
Precambrian (e.g., Peterson, Cotton, Gehling, & Pisani,
2008; Valentine, 2004, 2007), and to have involved
organisms that need not have had a close morphological
similarity to any animal living today, including modern
cnidarians. At present, we do not know what creatures
were involved, nor how they functioned and what ner-
vous systems did for them. Nerve nets, being a highly
primitive condition, provide an empirically plausible
starting point here. Finally, from a methodological per-
spective, taking nerve nets as the primitive condition is
a specific, unambiguous proposal that can be developed
and investigated in more detail. In the following, we
aim to show that working with this assumption pays
off, as it allows a systematic reinterpretation of what
basic nervous systems do. Thus we have our first tenta-
tive clue as to what the first nervous systems did:
Clue 1: The basic nervous system configuration consists of a
diffuse nerve net.
3 Reasons for a critical attitude towards
the input–output interpretation
Although the input–output view is deeply entrenched,
there are issues involving nervous system functioning
that are highly puzzling or awkward when the input–
output view is taken as a fundamental account of ner-
vous systems. The following discussion will clarify dif-
ferent problematic aspects of the input–output view,
and provide material for three more clues.
3.1 Computational interpretations and
neurodynamical complexities
The current input–output interpretation of nervous sys-
tems is closely linked to a computational information-
processing interpretation. This linkage is intrinsic to the
classic neuron doctrine, according to which neurons are
individual entities that receive and send electrical signals
to one another through synapses in an all-or-none fashion
that is basically similar to electrical switches. Consistent
with the neuron doctrine’s one-way flow of information,
Figure 2. A nerve net drawing based on a RFamide-positive
staining of the nerve net of a Hydra oligactis, showing denser
areas around the mouth opening and its stalk (peduncle).
Reproduced with kind permission from Springer
(Grimmelikhuijzen, 1985).
4 Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
 at University of Groningen on February 6, 2013adb.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
nervous systems could be interpreted as electronic circui-
try, which may be far more complex than artificial circui-
try, but not intrinsically different. McCulloch and Pitts
(1943) provided the connection between nervous systems
and logical systems, and from that time the brain could
be seen as a powerful biological computer in which neu-
rons acted as logic gates (Gardner, 1985).
The problem with this input-output interpretation is
that the neuron doctrine on which it is based has been
seriously undermined (e.g., Bullock et al., 2005; Guillery,
2007; Kruger & Otis, 2007) since it was first advanced by
Ramon y Cajal in the late 19th century. Famously, Cajal
formulated what came to be called the neuron doctrine
explicitly in opposition to the then-current idea that ner-
vous systems are reticular organizations of nerve cells
directly connected to one another, through which electri-
cal activity flows diffusely in all directions (Guillery, 2007;
Kruger & Otis, 2007). Famously, Cajal won the debate
on the basis of landmark empirical studies that indicated
directed, one-way flows of nervous electrical activity. A
lot has happened in neuroscience since then, however.
Evidence from biology and neurophysiology that
undermines the sufficiency of the neuron doctrine has
been accumulating for years. While the electron micro-
scope first vindicated Cajal’s view of the membranous
separation at the synaptic junction in 1956, only a year
later the same instrument led to the discovery of gap
junctions—sometimes called electrical synapses—that
directly couple nerve cells electrically, as proposed by
the reticularists (Guillery, 2007). While initially the elec-
trical transmission through gap junctions was consid-
ered a primitive form of signaling, it later became clear
that these channels could be modulated and were plastic
in a way that resembled chemical synapses and signaling
flows (Bullock et al., 2005). Furthermore, gap junctions
have been described between neurons and non-neural
cells such as astrocytes (Bullock et al., 2005). The neu-
ron doctrine can not plausibly explain the diversity of
neuromodulatory substances, such as amines and neu-
ropeptides, that remodel neuron behavior and circuitry
within minutes and hours instead of the standard milli-
second time scale (Bullock et al., 2005). Many of these
neuromodulatory molecules are not recent evolutionary
developments but have a deep genomic history. More
recently, immune system elements, such as cytokines,
have been shown to play critical roles in modulating
neural plasticity under normal as well as challenged
conditions (McAfoose and Baune, 2009; Yirmiya and
Goshen, 2011), and these associations are also very old
(Maier and Watkins, 1998). The neuron doctrine cannot
explain these associations either. Moreover, in many
neurons, action potentials can travel backward from the
axon and cell body to the dendrites.
Then there is the astonishing dynamism of the neu-
ron, and thus of the nervous system more generally.
This dynamism begins with the plasticity of the
synapses, ‘‘which are not fixed structures, but are
subject to a process of continual pruning, and replace-
ment by new synapses—the real driver of neural learn-
ing, rather than mere changes in synaptic weights’’
(Smythies, 2002, p. 2). Receptors for neurotransmitters,
neuropeptides and other signaling molecules in the
neural membrane have proved not to be roving
iceberg-like structures awaiting ligands, as long sup-
posed, but are subject to ‘‘a continual dynamic process
of rapid internalization into the postsynaptic neuron,’’
where they may be broken down or recycled to the
surface and reused (Smythies, 2002, p. 2). Some neuros-
cientists even argue that the classic picture of the neu-
ron as a linear computational unit is not merely highly
idealized but ‘‘wildly inaccurate’’ (Smythies, 2002).
While most of these empirical discoveries have been
around for some, or even many years, they have had so
far only a limited impact on views concerning the global
operation of nervous systems. A good explanation for
this is the powerful influence of the input–output view
itself, which fits the neuron doctrine nicely but under
which the findings just described have no ready explana-
tion. From the input–output perspective, these findings
may be cast as mere details or even quirks that need not
readily impact on the general information-processing
operation of the brain as exemplified by the neuron doc-
trine. But that would be a mistake. In contrast, we hold
that these developments break the tight analytic connec-
tion between the neuron doctrine and the standard input–
output view by questioning the generality of the neuron
doctrine itself. When these complex findings are taken as
a starting point, there is ample reason for questioning and
scrutinizing the input–output view of nervous systems.
Clue 2: The detailed operation of neurons and nervous sys-
tems is much more complex and diverse than can be readily
accounted for by the input–output view.
3.2 Reflexes are not necessarily primitive
While the input–output view is currently most developed
in its computational form as described above, an earlier
and more basic form derives from the notion of reflex
action. The notion of a reflex as an involuntary reaction
to a stimulus has long been interpreted as a fundamental
unit of behavior. In his groundbreaking work,
Sherrington (1906) combined the behavioral notion of a
reflex with a view on the general layout of the nervous
system that incorporated the then-new neuron doctrine.
Whereas previously work on reflex action had been con-
ducted almost independently of anatomical and physio-
logical studies (Swazey, 1968), Sherrington put reflex
research on a firm physiological foundation, which led
to adoption of the reflex arc as a standard unit for ner-
vous system activity (Gallistel, 1980; Swazey, 1968). As
Sherrington put it: ‘‘the whole function of the nervous
system can be summed up in one word, conduction’’
(1906, p. 8). The neural organization representative of
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the reflex arc became seen as the basic organizational
principle of nervous systems and the basic representative
of the input–output view (Figure 3). The reflex arc orga-
nization is still held as a good idealization and basic
depiction of nervous system organization.
Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for being
uneasy with taking the reflex arc organization as the
basic organizational principle of nervous systems. First,
Sherrington derived this interpretation from detailed
work on the spinal organization of mammals. It is thus
based on complex, well-differentiated central nervous
systems rather than diffuse nerve nets. We should ask
whether the reflex arc organization can also be consid-
ered basic when the empirical starting point had con-
sisted of less differentiated nervous systems. The
following quote from Dean Wooldridge is illustrative
here:
The machinelike nature of the reflexes and tropisms that
so extensively regulate the behavior of the lower animals
was not appreciated as soon as it might have been by
workers in the field. This was probably because these ani-
mal responses do not have the precision and detailed
reproducibility that is usually observed in the commoner
reflexes of higher animals. The spines of the sea urchin are
likely to display a certain restless motion, even when no
stimulus is present, and the orientation toward a potential
enemy may involve a certain hesitation or lack of preci-
sion, together with a persistence of some of the original
restless motion, even after the enemy has been sensed.
(Wooldridge, 1963, p. 76)
Wooldridge, one of the pioneers who linked the litera-
ture on animal behavior and neuroscience to computa-
tional theory, argues that the ‘‘machinelike nature of
the reflexes’’ of ‘‘lower animals’’ is obscured by a lack of
precision and reproducibility. An alternative interpreta-
tion is also possible, however: Machinelike reflexes need
not be basic at all.
Indeed, several biologists and physiologists writing
on the evolution of nervous systems argue precisely this
point. At an early time, Parker (1919) already discussed
the ‘‘reflex deficiency’’ of lower animals. Later, Pantin
observes:
Early physiological workers were greatly impressed by the
basic simplicity of the vertebrate reflex arc, in which sti-
mulation results in a reflex motor discharge to a passive
skeletal muscle. But even in the simple nervous systems of
Actinians and Medusae it is clear that this is only one pos-
sible mode of nervous action. (1956, p. 177)
According to Pantin, the reflex arc is not a primitive
unit but a secondary simplification of parts of an ini-
tially complex system (Pantin, 1956, p. 176). Similar
claims were made by others who worked on the evolu-
tion and operation of basic nervous systems and were
aware that this message remained unheeded outside
their field (e.g., Horridge, 1968; Passano, 1963; Pavans
de Ceccaty 1974). Since then, however, this message has
vanished from sight, as can be witnessed in the citations
that began this article (e.g., Je´kely, 2011; Watanabe,
Fujisawa, & Holstein, 2009).
We will return to the background and current status
of these claims later on. For now, the main point is that
at least some experts in the field have argued that fast,
repeatable, and precise reflexes—in contrast to more
general diffuse reactions to stimuli—were very likely a
secondary development that did not reflect the basic
organization of nervous systems. The reflex arc organi-
zation as we know it has been derived from a centra-
lized nervous system, and it is not obvious to what
extent it applies to evolutionarily early forms of ner-
vous systems, such as nerve nets. We can now formu-
late our third clue:
Clue 3: The reflex arc organization may very well be a sec-
ondary optimization of nervous systems.
3.3 Biological information processing does not
require a nervous system
The input–output interpretation stresses that nervous
systems function as information processing devices.
However, in recent years serious claims concerning the
complexity, and even cognitive, nature of the behavior
of single-celled organisms have come to the fore. For
example, John Allman (1999) discusses how ‘‘the most
fundamental features of brains such as sensory integra-
tion, memory, decision-making, and the control of
behavior, can already be found’’ in simple organisms
such as bacteria (pp. 5–6). Recent microbiological stud-
ies agree that bacteria share many characteristics tradi-
tionally considered ‘‘cognitive’’ (e.g., Ben-Jacob,
Becker, Shapira, & Levine, 2004; Hellingwerf, 2005;
Lengeler, Mu¨ller, and di Primio, 2000; Shapiro, 2007;
Taylor, 2004; Van Duijn, Keijzer, and Franken, 2006).
Indeed, Jeffrey Stock and colleagues have suggested
that the information processing capacities of the
Figure 3. A schematic representation of the classic reflex arc
notion.
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receptor cluster at the leading pole of E. coli appear to
constitute a ‘‘nanobrain’’ (Webre, Wolanin, & Stock,
2003). Moreover, it is now becoming increasingly clear
that plants, in their reactions to a wide variety of external
stimuli, are also capable of highly complex forms of
information processing (Trewavas, 2005). Some research-
ers now even speak about plant neurobiology and ‘‘root
brains’’ to refer to the signaling within and between the
root tips of plants (e.g., Balusˇka et al., 2006).
These developments suggest that the information
processing interpretation of nervous systems does not
suffice to explain why nervous systems first evolved. At
microscopic scales, information processing tasks
required for adaptive behavior can be accomplished
without any nervous system. Thus, information pro-
cessing by itself does not meaningfully explain what a
basic nervous system adds to an organism’s behavioral
repertoire.
A plausible reprisal here is that nervous systems are
simply much better at information processing compared
with the means available to bacteria, protists, and
plants. While this is presumably true of complex ner-
vous systems, the point does not seem to apply to basic
forms. When one systematically compares organisms
with basic nervous systems, they do not show more
complex behavior than creatures without a nervous sys-
tem. In his classic Behavior of the Lower Organisms
(1906), H. S. Jennings provides a wide survey of experi-
ments relating to the behavioral capacities of bacteria,
paramecia, amoebae, and animals like hydra, sea ane-
mones, and flatworms. On the basis of his own experi-
ments as well as a review of the literature, Jennings
identifies 12 similarities between the behaviors of uni-
cellular organisms and metazoans with nervous systems
(1906, pp. 261–263) based on the
1) variety of stimuli to which the organism can
respond;
2) degree to which their behavior is determined by the
organism’s structure;
3) presence of regions specialized for sensation;
4) summation (computation) of stimuli;
5) degree to which the organism’s behavior is deter-
mined by its history;
6) presence of both attractive and aversive reactions
to stimuli;
7) whether reaction to stimulation is direct or indirect,
that is, involving the release of forces already pres-
ent in the organism;
8) occurrence of spontaneous action;
9) conduction of excitation in the organism;
10) changing reactions to different intensities of the
same stimulus (amplification, habituation);
11) variability of reactions to stimuli, depending on the
organism’s physiological state; and
12) the organism’s ability to sample different condi-
tions in an attempt to avoid irritation.
According to Jennings, ‘‘the possession of a nervous
system brings with it no observable essential changes in
the nature of behavior. We have found no important
additional features in the behavior when the nervous
system is added’’ (p. 263).
While Jennings’ observations are more than a century
old, contemporary research concerning the intelligence of
bacteria and plants demonstrates that they still apply,
perhaps even more so than they did in Jennings’ day,
thanks to advances in microscopy of which Jennings him-
self could have only dreamed. So the issue remains: in
terms of information processing abilities, basic nervous
systems do not seem to add much value.
Clue 4: Basic nervous systems do not lead to more complex
behavior than is often present in organisms without a nervous
system.
3.4 Summary
There are good reasons to subject the standard infor-
mation–processing, input–output view of nervous sys-
tems to further scrutiny. We should not assume that
input–output is the whole story of nervous systems
operation without looking at the relevant biological lit-
erature and research on basic nervous systems.
However, even this literature is strongly influenced by
input–output and information–processing interpreta-
tions, as we have already seen. Nevertheless, within the
literature on the origins of the earliest nervous systems
important alternative ideas can be found, and these will
provide the basis for the SBT proposal.
4 The animal behavior machine
For many years, work on the evolution of the earliest
and most basic nervous systems progressed slowly, yet
several hypotheses emerged to explain why and how neu-
rons and nervous systems could have evolved (e.g.,
Lentz, 1968; Lichtneckert & Reichert, 2007; Mackie,
1990; Moroz, 2009). Only with the rise of molecular and
genomic studies in the late 1980s did the field gain seri-
ous momentum. Since then a relatively clear picture has
emerged as to the evolutionary origins of many molecu-
lar constituents of nervous systems, based on compara-
tive data from many basic animal groups and phyla.
Foremost, it has become clear that there is a deep conti-
nuity at the molecular, genetic and physiological level
between organisms with and without nervous systems.
Key molecular components–such as ion channels, neuro-
transmitters and synaptic protein families–appear to
have been present in precursor organisms without
nervous systems, and even in single-celled ones
(Greenspan, 2007; Ryan & Grant, 2009). For example,
the voltage-dependent sodium channels that provide the
mechanism for action potentials in nervous systems (in
contrast to potassium channels that enable action
Adaptive Behavior 7
 at University of Groningen on February 6, 2013adb.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
potentials in single-celled Paramecium (Greenspan,
2007)) have now been shown to exist in organisms with-
out nervous systems (Liebeskind, Hilles, & Zakon, 2011).
The postsynaptic density (PSD) of chemical synapses
also has clear precursors in organisms without any ner-
vous system (Ryan & Grant, 2009; Sakarya et al., 2007).
In short, the electrical properties of neurons, as well as
chemical signaling, predate the evolution multicellularity.
While molecular studies have been essential to unra-
veling the deep past of nervous systems, they must still
be supplemented by studies of the macroscopic pheno-
type and functioning of the first organisms with nervous
systems (Seipel & Schmid, 2005). At this bodily level,
progress is slower and the results are less clear-cut. A
wide variety of proposals have been advanced, without
obvious ways to choose between them. For example,
Moroz (2009) recently argued that central nervous sys-
tems, and even neurons, may have evolved several times
and in various forms across the phylogenetic tree, while
Je´kely (2011) suggests that neural circuits arose for the
control of ciliary locomotion. The ongoing discussion
of such diverse hypotheses shows that molecular and
genomic data alone do not solve this puzzle. There is a
continuing need to develop an account of the origins of
nervous systems at the bodily, morphological scale.
In such circumstances, it becomes clear why it is
important to develop better, more specific ideas con-
cerning what basic nervous systems did that increased
whole-organism fitness and thereby led to the evolution
of increasing complexity. Rather than particular evolu-
tionary scenarios of how nervous systems evolved in
historical time, the issue is how very basic nervous sys-
tems may have functioned, what fitness benefits they
may have provided, and how those benefits may have
influenced historical evolution. While this approach is
closely linked to evolutionary accounts, a fundamental
difference is that it addresses proximate questions about
the possible dynamical operation of primitive organiza-
tions. Also, while proposals for primitive organizations
remain hypothetical, they can be further developed and
virtually tested, such as in simulation studies and
robotics (Chiel & Beer, 1997; Webb, 2009). Here, we
introduce a more abstract and generalizing conceptual
approach, which targets the proximate question of how
the first nervous systems could have operated to
increase the fitness of a behaving organism. We aim to
articulate general principles that can explain how and
why neurons and the most basic nerve nets have evolved
rather than any particular evolutionary scenario.
The outlines of precisely such a general answer to
our proximate question can be found in one of the older
evolutionary proposals within the literature on this
topic. Carl Pantin (1956) advanced an account of the
origins of nervous systems that focused on the central
importance of muscle-based animal behavior what he
called the metazoan behavior machine. Before going
there, we must take account of two more clues:
Clue 5: Many of the biomolecular characteristics of neurons
are already present in non-neural precursor contexts.
Clue 6: Understanding what nervous systems do is a question
that requires an answer at the level of the whole animal.
4.1 Pantin’s muscles and functional behavior
The locus classicus in the study of the origins of the first
nervous systems is G. W. Parker’s The Elementary
Nervous System from 1919. Parker took the reflex arc,
as exemplified by the vertebrate spinal cord, as the basic
nervous system setup that his theory had to explain.
His central question was: How could a nervous system
consisting of sensors, effectors and connecting neurons
have evolved? Parker provided a clear answer in the
form of a three-stage evolutionary development. In the
first stage, there were only independent effectors without
any neurons or sensors. The second stage consisted of
receptor–effector systems. In the third and final stage,
conducting nerve cells connected the sensory and motor
cells across larger distances, thus enabling the full reflex
arc organization so well exemplified in the spinal orga-
nization of vertebrates.
Pantin (1956) criticized this account. Parker’s aim
had been to provide an explanation for the reflex arc
organization as the basic building block of the nervous
system. Pantin asked a different question: How do ner-
vous systems enable organisms to move about and do
things?
Foremost, Pantin took issue with Parker’s focus on
single, independent effectors. In multicellular animals,
functional behavior does not generally derive from sin-
gle, independent effectors.
In the Metazoa [animals] the real effector is not a single
individual cell. The contraction of an individual cell is of
little importance in the behaviour of animals, except in some
highly specialized tissues. In the simplest animals the motor
system is an entire connected field of contractile tissue, like
the muscular network spread over the whole body of a
Coelenterate
1
[such as jellyfish] . These contractile sheets
act upon an internal fluid skeleton of water and tissue.
Thus, in Coelenterates, the complex and important move-
ments required in behaviour can only be brought about
indirectly through the co-ordinated contraction of large
regions of these muscle sheets., which indirectly move and
distort the body into the position or shape required.. The
Metazoan behaviour machine did not evolve cell by cell and
reflex by reflex. From its origin it must have involved the
structure of the whole animal, and it must have been com-
plex enough and organized enough to meet all the varied
requirements of behavior. (Pantin, 1956, p. 173)
Thus Pantin and others came to doubt the primacy of
the reflex arc as the fundamental substrate of nervous
system organization. None denied importance of
reflexes. Rather, they believed reflex arcs should be
regarded as stereotyped short cuts within a muscle-based
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‘‘behavior machine’’ consisting of widespread contractile
tissues, whose activity must be coordinated for func-
tional behavior.
Spontaneous, endogenously generated activity was
essential in this view. In work that further developed
Pantin’s basic idea, L.M. Passano (1963) highlighted the
relevance of the nervous system’s endogenous activity.
Passano claimed that Pantin’s muscle sheets would
require internal pacemakers to enable coordinated con-
traction. External stimulation thus did not simply result
in the reaction of a passive animal but in the modification
of ongoing and self-sustaining patterns of neural activity.
Pantin and Passano are important for their stress on
the specific physical and biomechanical requirements for
animal behavior, and how this would have shaped the
evolution and functioning of the first nervous systems.
All behavior of larger animals derives from contracting
muscle tissue, and nervous systems were initially mainly
involved in coordinating such tissue. This idea provides
the heart of the SBT, the focus of Section 5. For now,
we can formulate two additional clues:
Clue 7: The main animal effector consists of muscle tissue
that requires spatiotemporal coordination.
Clue 8: Coordinating extensive areas of muscle tissue
requires endogenous activity.
4.2 The impact of conductive epithelia
Soon after Pantin and Passano stressed the fundamental
importance of muscle coordination, the discovery of con-
ductive epithelia altered the explanatory landscape
(Mackie, 1965, 1970). George Mackie proved experimen-
tally that the external surface of an animal can act as a
conducting sheet where action potentials, once initiated,
travel in all directions (reminiscent of the reticularists’
ideas). These epithelial cells were electrically linked by
gap junctions (Anderson, 1980; Josephson, 1985). The
implications for Pantin’s proposal seemed dire. The
impression was that whole-body coordination of exten-
sive muscle sheets could be accomplished by a conduc-
tive epithelium closely linked to a sheet of contractile
tissue, or even by a single myoepithelium that combined
both functions. There simply was no need for any ner-
vous system at this point. Everything required to put the
animal behavior machine in operation seemed to be built
into conductive and contractile epithelia, which appeared
to be ‘‘simultaneously sensory systems, conductive sys-
tems, and effectors’’ (Josephson, 1985, p. 139).
The discovery of conductive epithelia provided a
new question for studies of the origins of nervous sys-
tems: What purpose do nervous systems serve when they
evolve in the presence of conductive epithelia? The answer
that became dominant focused on two characteristics of
modern neurons: chemical synapses and elongated axo-
dendritic processes. Compared with diffuse epithelial
conduction, nervous systems were thought to provide
more precise signaling and specific connections. In
keeping with the neuron doctrine, synaptic signaling
was considered important for allowing the directionality
of signaling as well as the modification of signals trans-
mitted to the next cell, including inhibition. Elongated
projections evolved to provide ‘‘a more selective type of
excitation’’ in which specific regions of effectors could
be controlled independently (Mackie, 1990, p. 908),
while axons and dendrites enabled neurons ‘‘to transmit
beyond their immediate neighbors without exciting all
the intervening cells en route’’ (Horridge, 1968, p. 26).
Both components were combined in Mackie’s hypoth-
esis that neural connections could have evolved from
conductive myoepithelia to provide specific connections
between far-flung sensors and effectors (Mackie 1970).
However, there is an important difficulty with the
idea that nervous systems developed on top of excitable
epithelia to form precisely targeted connections. As we
have seen it is a plausible assumption that the most
basic and earliest form of nervous system consisted of
diffusely connected nerve nets (Clue 1), rather than spe-
cialized tracts between definite sensors and effectors.
Precisely targeted connections and wirings characteris-
tic of reflexes only become prominent in more differen-
tiated nervous systems (Clue 3). While diffuse nerve
nets may have arisen as a secondary development from
such targeted connections, this is not the most econom-
ical explanation. While long-distance connections and
synaptic transmission very likely are key features of
early nervous systems, precise connections between sen-
sors and effectors are not.
Thus while Pantin’s proposal seemed to be super-
seded as an account of why nervous systems first
evolved, it remained insufficiently clear whether con-
ductive epithelia could really play the role of coordinat-
ing the animal behavior machine. To this day, it
remains a perfectly plausible possibility that conductive
epithelia provide only a coarse form of coordination,
while early nerve nets enabled more sophisticated
forms. Pantin’s proposal requires further attention.
4.3 Updating Pantin’s proposal
Nowadays, the picture has changed again. While
Mackie’s scenario for the origins of nervous systems is
still influential (e.g., Arendt, 2008; Je´kely, 2011;
Miller, 2009), it faces important difficulties. A key
problem is that nervous systems are found more
widely among animal phyla and classes than electri-
cally coupled conductive epithelia. Notably, while all
four major cnidarian classes have a nervous system,
there is substantial evidence that only the Hydrozoa
have functional gap junctions (Mackie, Anderson, &
Singla, 1984; Satterlie, 2011). Given the usefulness of
gap junctions (Fushiki, Hamada, Yoshimura, &
Endo, 2010), it is unlikely that this major invention
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has been secondarily lost in three separate cnidarian
lineages. Rather, it seems that electrical coupling
between cells evolved later, and separately in the
Hydrozoa and in the higher animals. It is doubtful,
therefore, that electrically coupled conductive (myo)-
epithelia could have preceded the evolution of ner-
vous systems.
While this argument could provide a reason to
return to Pantin’s original proposal, it raises problems
for a modernized version in which there is a gradual
evolution from conductive (myo)epithelia to diffusely
connected nerve nets, both acting as coordinators of
muscle-based movement. However, as discussed above,
molecular studies have established that chemical signal-
ing and electrical conduction arose very early, even
before multicellularity and certainly before the first ner-
vous systems (Clue 5). By implication, the other key
feature of modern neurons—axodendritic processes—
appears to be a later addition; it follows that these dif-
ferent neuronal features could have evolved succes-
sively and independently. Most notably:
In this case the evolution of the first nervous systems con-
sists of at least two separate evolutionary steps:
1. The evolution of chemical transmission, allowing cells to
pass electrical signals to adjacent cells.
2. The evolution of axodendritic processes that enable
electrical signals to be sent to non-neighboring cells. (Van
Elburg, De Wiljes, Biehl, & Keijzer, submitted)
While nerve nets would only have arisen with the second
step, a conductive system where adjacent cells pass on
electrical signals through chemical transmission can be
considered both as a proto-nervous system and as a pri-
mitive form of a conductive epithelium. Given the mole-
cular evidence, this form of conductive epithelium may
have been present very early in metazoan evolution and
could have allowed a gradual evolutionary trajectory to
full nervous systems (Van Elburg et al., submitted).
While the early evolutionary presence of chemically
transmitting epithelia is hypothetical, this condition has
been studied in simulations using realistic biomolecular
properties (De Wiljes, Van Elburg, Biehl, & Keijzer,
2010; Van Elburg et al., submitted). These studies show
that such (myo)epithelia can provide patterned activity
initiated by noise alone (Figure 4) and are plausibly cast
as a basic coordinative device. Given the fundamental
lack of empirical data on the morphology and function-
ing of the Precambrian organisms involved, we will take
such conductive (myo)epithelia as a sufficiently plausi-
ble basis to develop an updated version of Pantin’s pro-
posal. The ironic twist here is that while electrically
conducting epithelia now are dismissed as precursors of
nervous systems, a chemically transmitting equivalent
may be cast both as a proto-nervous system and as the
actual embodiment of Pantin’s original proposal.
Pantin’s proposal can now be rephrased as involving
two steps. First, a basic conductive epithelial organiza-
tion provided a means to coordinate basic forms of
muscle-based movement. This organization can also be
interpreted as a proto-nervous system as it incorporates
already one key feature of full nervous systems: chemi-
cal transmission. Second, with the subsequent evolution
of axodendritic processes (and full nervous systems) a
new kind of organization arose that enabled a much
more fine-tuned coordination of muscle-based move-
ment. In the following, we will develop this update of
Pantin’s proposal further into the SBT. For now, we
can summarize the above in three tentative clues:
Clue 9: Chemical transmission between adjacent cells can
have provided the basis for primitive conductive epithelia that
formed a half-way station to nerve nets.
Clue 10: Chemically transmitting conductive (myo)epithelia
can have provided a basic form of muscle coordination.
Clue 11: Specialized axodendritic connections can have sub-
sequently evolved to broaden the existing possibilities for
muscle coordination.
5 The skin brain thesis
Pantin’s proposal that the coordination of a muscle sur-
face is the key to understanding early nerve net evolu-
tion leads to two fundamental questions:
(a) How can early nervous systems have operated?
(b) What benefits can nervous systems have provided
even in the basic form of nerve nets?
Our proposal focuses on the problem of initiating and
maintaining efficient and fast sensorimotor coordina-
tion for multicellular organisms of increasing size. This
involved a switch from movement by cilia to movement
by means of muscle contraction. Building on Clue 7,
we argue that early nerve nets were primarily involved
in enabling muscle-based movement. The result was
behavior of similar outward intelligence as already
present in many bacteria and protists (Clue 4), but now
on the scale of increasingly large multicellular organ-
isms. Nerve nets initially did not make for smarter
behavior, but for muscular behavior.
Under this interpretation, the core business of such
nerve nets consisted of organizing and integrating
activity across contractile effector surfaces (e.g., mus-
cle) spread out beneath an external epithelium. Such a
task would involve parallel organization and coordina-
tion requiring signaling across a surface rather than a
through-conducting, sequential organization based on
a set of pre-existing sensors and effectors. No stimulus
can specify by itself the behaviorally relevant contrac-
tion patterns across such a surface. Patterns that
work—that is, patterns that lead to movements that
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are appropriate under the circumstances—are a func-
tion of the particular effector surface that is present in
the animals rather than of any triggering stimulus.
Also, based on what we know about organisms today,
movement is likely to have been self-induced, while
external stimuli acted rather as modulating factors on
continuous effector activity.
Self-evidently, effector surface activity must continu-
ously adapt to environmental conditions. Importantly,
while we build on the idea that at evolutionary early
stages the main functional problem was to initiate and
maintain coherent effector surface activity in a way that
was not strongly constrained by specific sensors, we also
argue that the skin brain organization provides a pre-
adaptation, or exaptation, for spatially extended sensors.
5.1 Motility, size, and muscle
Motility must be the key starting point for a discussion
of what nervous systems do. While modern nervous sys-
tems have various other functions, it is evident that
enabling an organism to move and manipulate its envi-
ronment in specific ways is the prime reason for the
huge investment in these metabolically expensive organs
(Allman, 1999). Motility allows an organism to avoid
harmful situations, seek out beneficial circumstances
and change the environment outside the organism in
ways that make it more amenable for the organism to
survive, thrive and reproduce. However, being motile in
itself does not require a nervous system, as many organ-
isms are quite capable of doing all of the above without
one.
The complex motile behavior of many bacteria and
single-celled eukaryotes is often achieved by the use of
flagella and cilia. Both flagella and cilia are extensions
of the cell and structurally very similar. However, cilia
are shorter and tend to occur in relatively larger num-
bers (in patches or tracts), while flagella are long and
generally occur singly or in pairs (Brusca & Brusca,
2003). Beating cilia or rotating flagella provide both a
propulsive force that can move an organism through a
liquid. Such behavior can be controlled by electrical
signaling and action potentials, all in a single cell.
Paramecium provides a well-studied case. The beating
of a paramedicum’s cilia is speeded up by hyperpolari-
zation induced by deformation of its membrane when
it collides with something on its back end (Greenspan,
2007). In contrast, a collision at the front can generate
an action potential that induces a rapid uniform change
in the membrane potential of the whole organism. This
reverses the direction in which the cilia beat globally,
moves the animal away from the obstacle, and allows
the protist to reorient and propel itself in a new direc-
tion (Greenspan, 2007).
However, motility by means of cellular extensions
imposes strong limitations on the size organisms can
achieve. It works well for single-celled bacteria as small
as 1 mm and for protists, like Paramecium, that are rela-
tively huge at 180 mm (Greenspan, 2007). Multicellular
metazoa such as flatworms, the size of which can be
measured in millimeters, also employ this form of loco-
motion (Trueman, 1975). The largest creatures driven
by cilia are the comb jellies, which can grow to many
centimeters (Brusca & Brusca, 2003).
2
However, these
latter cases are at the very limits of what cilia can do,
and they require specific adaptations to fairly limited
niche conditions. In all, cilia and flagella are only gen-
erally effective as a motility mechanism for creatures at
or below the millimeter scale, which sets a strong con-
straint on the size of motile animals.
Assuming that evolutionary benefits were to be had
for larger multicellular organisms to become or remain
motile, the only way to achieve this was by developing a
new mechanism for motility (Bonner, 2000; Dusenbury,
1996). In this context, tapping into new means for gen-
erating motility could be beneficial even when the over-
all functionality resulting from this motility did not
change very much initially, as indicated by the findings
of Jennings. To show, by way of analogy, how size mat-
ters, take the task of building Stonehenge. With toy
blocks, the task is easily achieved by hand. If the struc-
ture is to be much larger, however, new ways of moving
the blocks are required. The ‘‘same’’ task is vastly more
difficult, even though the end result remains structu-
rally similar.
Figure 4. A simulation of a conductive myoepithelium using
realistic biomolecular properties and chemical transmission
between cells. (a): Ten time frames of a case where individual
cells are connected to all six neighbors and spontaneous firing of
single cells leads to expanding patterns that travel along a tube-
like body. (b): Cells are connected to only three neighbors,
forcing the spontaneous patterns to travel from bottom to top.
Figure kindly provided by Ot de Wiljes.
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As organisms grow larger, then, the evolution of
muscle-based movement becomes central. As Seipel
and Schmid formulate it: ‘‘The replacement of ciliary
motility by muscle-driven locomotion must have repre-
sented an important selective advantage in preying and
escape’’ (2005, p. 20). While cilia—literally—only allow
your skin to crawl, internal sheets of contractile cells
make it possible to use the body itself to accomplish
motility. Such an arrangement only became possible
with the advent of developmental processes and geno-
mic signaling that enabled the growth of integrated
multicellular bodies with specialized structures (Arendt,
2008). Muscle cells appear to have evolved by assem-
bling new variants of motor proteins for fast and slow
contraction and by forming adhesive substrates that
can withstand and counteract the contraction forces
generated (Seipel & Schmid, 2005). Such cellular con-
tractions must be coordinated with respect to one
another, however. Uncoordinated contractions by indi-
vidual cells would not result in whole-body motility.
This, we believe, is where nervous systems come in.
Nerve nets are intrinsically tied up with muscle surfaces.
The origin of early nerve nets thus must be linked to the
organization of coordinated activity across muscle sur-
faces as first stressed by Pantin. The question before us
now concerns the possible contribution of early nerve
nets. To provide our answer it will be necessary to turn
first to a more general way of describing the source of
this form of motility.
5.2 Patterning Pantin surfaces
Pantin stressed the importance of systematic large-scale
contractions and extensions of muscle sheets as being
the heart of the animal behavior machine: ‘‘In the sim-
plest animals the motor system is an entire connected
field of contractile tissue, like the muscular network
spread over the whole body of a Coelenterate’’ (Pantin,
1956). In the following, we will refer to the contractile
surface of any animal as the animal’s Pantin surface.
We define a Pantin surface as the total muscle surface
that an animal has available for motility. A Pantin sur-
face can consist of a single continuous muscle sheet—
as in the basic case under discussion here—but it can
also take discontinuous and three-dimensional forms
when it is constituted by dispersed and various muscle
groups in more differentiated animals. In all cases, the
Pantin surface is a comparatively large surface or vol-
ume compared with the individual muscle cells that
constitute it. At the same time it has a specific form—
depending on the anatomy of the animal—and a spe-
cific and limited range of sizes—depending on individ-
ual and developmental differences. Using the Pantin
surface as a general description of the muscle-based
animal behavior machine, we can stipulate that motility
in animals derives from patterns of contraction and
extension across the Pantin surface. This description in
terms of Pantin surfaces allows an abstract characteri-
zation of the specific form of the problem of using con-
tractile tissues for whole-body motility in a way that
can generalize over different body forms and inner
anatomies.
At times, it will be useful to differentiate between
coordination and patterning. Coordination is a stan-
dard term for synchronized movement involving activ-
ity of an organism. Limbs must move in a coordinated
way to produce forward movement, for example.
Patterning refers to the regular spatial relations of cells
in the contraction–extension —activity induced across
a Pantin surface. Suitable patterning results in coordi-
nated activity. For the sake of convenience we often
will refer to Pantin patterning as ‘‘coordination’’.
No detailed assumptions are made concerning the
kind of organisms that first evolved a Pantin surface,
but we take them to be organisms possessing a conduc-
tive epithelium and underlying contractile cells or with
a myoepithelium that both conducts and contracts. In
the basic case, the body itself acts as the muscle’s
antagonist, extending the contracted muscle surface
again when activation ceases, like the jellyfish’s ‘‘jelly’’.
To enable global animal motility, the dynamic pat-
terning of a Pantin surface would very likely involve a
number of general features. On general theoretical
grounds one can predict that such patterning should at
least be: (a) tailored to the animal body on which it
occurs; (b) specific in the sense that it suffices for func-
tionally adequate patterns of contraction; (c) repeatable
and reliable in the sense that it can be turned on and
off under appropriate circumstances; (d) resistant to
minor disturbances; and (e) adapt to changes in size
and constitution of the muscle sheet due to growth and
other life events. What these features of dynamic pat-
terning share is a sensitivity, via some form of feed-
back, to changes in global patterns.
Pantin’s proposal can now be rephrased: early ner-
vous systems evolved to pattern a Pantin surface (Clue
7), largely dependent on self-generated activity (Clue 8).
Expanding Pantin’s proposal we incorporate two addi-
tional clues: Chemical transmission between adjacent
cells could have provided primitive (and proto-neural)
conductive (myo)epithelia (Clue 9), which may have
constituted a basic form of muscle coordination (Clue
10). An important question remains, however: Can
Conductive epithelia act as successful Pantin patterners?
5.3 Excitable myoepithelia
The simplest example that combines a non-neural con-
ductive epithelium with a Pantin surface is a conductive
myoepithelium where conducting cells double as con-
tractile units. A modern example consists of the striated
swimming muscle in many hydromedusae and siphono-
phores (Mackie, 2004a). However, as we are not
addressing the details of any modern model organism
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or myoepithelium, we propose a conceptualization that
allows the articulation of general principles involved in
coordination by such means. A good place to start such
a general approach comes from the consideration that
conductive epithelia constitute excitable media that can
be modeled and understood in terms of self-organizing
pattern formation (Meron, 1992; Zykov, 1987, 2008).
The term excitable media came into use when it was
realized that the mechanisms behind the traveling wave
patterns in autocatalytic chemical reactions like the
Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction had properties that
were very similar to action potential propagation as
described by Hodgkin and Huxley (Meron, 1992).
Other examples of excitable media are Turing patterns
on animal skins or even human crowds producing the
‘‘Mexican wave’’ traveling round a football stadium
(Farkas, Helbing, & Vicsek, 2002). More complex
cases—also in three dimensions—are provided by the
heart, where electrical signals travel through both
neural and muscle tissue to produce coordinated con-
traction (Nash & Panfilov, 2004; Panfilov,
Keldermann, & Nash, 2007).
Excitable media are well known for the ways in
which local diffusion or conduction characteristics
allow the production of global patterns across the
medium. When excitatory and inhibitory activity
spread at different speeds, a broad variety of global
patterning can arise. Such patterns can also be con-
trolled and forced, for example, by feedback mechan-
isms or other kinds of modulation (Sakurai, Mihaliuk,
Chirila, & Showalter, 2002; Vanag & Epstein, 2008).
Excitable media can be described in an intuitively tract-
able way in terms of cellular automata:
1. Each cell can be in either an excited, a receptive, or a
refractory state.
2. Excited cells become refractory after a certain length of
time, and must stay that way for a fixed period until
returning to the receptive state.
3. Receptive cells are transformed to the excited state if a
certain proportion of their neighbours are excited. (Ball,
2009, p.123)
Conductive myoepithelia—both modern and our
hypothetical chemically conducting ones—are clear
instances of excitable media. Local electrical activity is
passed onward, triggering neighboring cells and so on
leading to the buildup of large (bodily) scale patterns
across the epithelial surface. Whether and if so which
patterns arise will depend on, and change with, vari-
ables like the conductive properties of the cells, the
kind and number of cellular connections and the size
and form of the Pantin surface (De Wiljes et al., 2010).
We want to stress that the biomolecular makeup of the
cells involved is very rich, providing different ion chan-
nels, chemical transmitters, feedback loops and so on
that offer sufficient instruments for a rich potential
array of large-scale patterning (Clue 5). A good exam-
ple would be the presence of mechanosensitive ion
channels that respond to tension in cell membranes
such as might be produced by contraction (Hamill &
Martinac, 2001; Sachs, 2010).
Important ingredients of patterning by excitable
media are mixtures of excitation and inhibition travel-
ing at different speeds across the medium. A chemically
transmitting myoepithelium could manage the excita-
tion and inhibition, for example, if cell-to-cell signaling
goes through different chemical synapses. In modern
cnidarians, different speeds of signaling may be accom-
plished by different ion channels. Aglantha digitale pro-
vides an existence proof for this possibility: A large
Na+-dependent excitatory post-synaptic potential and
a much slower, low-amplitude Ca2+-based excitatory
action potential allows two different speeds of conduc-
tion in the same nerves (Mackie, 2004b).
Generally speaking, it seems plausible that the tool-
box provided by an excitable myoepithelium is, by and
large, sufficient to fulfill the basic theoretical require-
ments for suitable Pantin patterning to a significant
degree (De Wiljes et al., 2010). The rich biomolecular
make up of living tissue allows for many different
possibilities of patterning as well as the incorporation
of various forms of feedback from the macroscopic
patterns to the biomolecular and cellular level (Sakurai
et al., 2002; Vanag & Epstein, 2008).
At the same time, there are also obvious limitations to
the patterning possibilities of excitable myoepithelia
because of their anatomical structure as uniform sheets
of conductive tissue. Providing patterns tailored to the
requirements of a particular Pantin surface seems diffi-
cult for a uniform structure. Local modifications at a
biomolecular level, such as the dispersal of specialized
ion channels and other features, can help to adapt the
sheet’s patterning to local requirements. But it also seems
evident that beneficial changes could be made at a larger
anatomical level that would add to and modify the sheet-
like organization. The inability of signals carried by
epithelial conduction to jump across intermediate tissue
without activating it is a major limitation, for example.
This limits the setup to a single connected epithelium that
must encompass all, or at least large parts, of the animal.
Both the mentioned possibilities as well as the lim-
itations demand further investigation to assess their
importance and empirical status. Further studies will
also be required to assess the biomolecular, physiologi-
cal and anatomical mechanisms that may realize them.
We cannot address these empirical issues here, but gen-
erally speaking it is clear that excitable myoepithelia
have a number of characteristics that are highly appro-
priate for organizing motility through muscle contrac-
tion, while at the same time such a structure has an
obvious limitation as a Pantin patterner.
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5.4 Nerve nets as modifiable and discontinuous
excitable media
When excitable myoepithelia are interpreted as a basic
Pantin patterner, how does the evolution of the first
nerve nets fit in? While it has been common to stress
the need for specific neural connections at this stage, as
does Mackie, in line with the input–output interpreta-
tion, we want to highlight the diffuse character of pri-
mitive nerve nets.
In contrast to the input–output interpretation, the
SBT casts early nervous systems in a role that combines
the development of extended processes and synaptic con-
nections with a diffuse network structure. While an exci-
table myoepithelium can plausibly act as a basic Pantin
patterner, there are limitations. At the same time,
Pantin patterning remains a prime directive for all
forms of muscle-based motility and we propose that
the functioning of early nervous systems is related to
overcoming some of these limitations.
The SBT can now be formulated as the proposition
that early nerve nets evolved when some conducting
cells—either within or connected to the myoepithelium—
evolved elongated processes and synaptic connections in a
way that modified and enhanced the patterning capabil-
ities of a pre-existing myoepithelium. Rather than pro-
viding specific connections from sensors to effectors,
the proper function of such nerve nets was to control,
modify and extend the available self-organized pattern-
ing across a Pantin surface. The key adaptation pro-
vided by early nerve nets was the way in which they
added to the generic self-organizing properties of pre-
existing epithelial and muscular tissues.
Evolving a loose network of conducting cells with far-
flung processes and synapses has two important general
advantages above a myoepithelium. First, there are new
options for generating self-organizing patterned activity
across a Pantin surface. One interesting possibility that
deserves further attention derives from a modeling study
by Jeltsch, Mu¨ller, Grimm, Wissel, and Brandl (1997).
They showed that adding a limited number of long-dis-
tance connections within an excitable medium could lead
to larger-scaled patterning across the medium. When
translated to the present case, this could imply that add-
ing long distance connections in the form of neural pro-
cesses could enable wave-like patterning across larger
Pantin surfaces. In this way, patterning could be adapted
to larger-sized animals and changes in body size during
growth. Having chemical synaptic connections would
also add to the excitable properties of the myoepithelium
and nerve net system, for example, by enabling inhibi-
tion. Whether these particular features of nerve nets
actually acted in the roles mentioned remains speculative
at present, but these options are open to investigation
and would provide clear ways in which even very limited
nerve nets could change the self-organizing properties of
pre-existing excitable myoepithelia.
A second general advantage of nerve nets, compared
with conductive myoepithelia, is their enormous flexi-
bility. While excitable myoepithelia consist of a contin-
uous unbroken sheet, nerve nets can take many forms.
They can be repositioned inside the organism, isolating
their functioning from external disturbances. They can
send activation across intervening tissues without acti-
vating the latter. Nerve nets can also, because of their
anatomical makeup, be more easily tailored to its
Pantin surface at an anatomical level. With nerve nets,
it becomes possible for the Pantin surface to be split up
and become dispersed across separate muscle groups
rather than remaining a single connected muscle sheet.
Specialized antagonist muscle groups become a subse-
quent possibility. Even if nerve nets may initially have
been generally uniform, breaking this symmetry predic-
tably also could provide benefits. Examples might
include developing inhibitory tracts between antagonist
muscles, or circuitry to support standardized global
(reflex) reactions to predictable stimuli (Clue 3).
With this latter claim, we come finally to the sensory
aspects of a skin brain organization. First, note that
sensory inputs in the form of local molecular or cellular
sensitivity to chemical and physical environmental fea-
tures are metabolically cheap, and present in all life
forms (Smith, 2008). Such sensitivity is often used inde-
pendent of any nervous system. Given the general use-
fulness of such sensitivity, existing nervous systems
would almost self-evidently incorporate such sensors.
Such sensors can take up a role as modulators of
ongoing Pantin patterning, inducing switching between
different main patterns or a change of direction. For
particular ecologically relevant stimuli, we may plausi-
bly assume that specific setups which lead to fast,
highly stereotypical reactions recognizable as reflexes.
However, sensory inputs of this kind do not by
themselves provide sensitivity to extended surface struc-
tures. This requires spatially extended physical arrays
of sensory elements acting together like the retina or
skin, not individual pinpricks. Again, within extended
sensors—in particular the retina—transverse interac-
tions between elements within the sensory array are
crucial, for example, reciprocal inhibition to enhance
contrast. An interesting connection can now be drawn
between such a sensory setup and a skin brain organi-
zation. Obviously, this connection needs to be fleshed
out, but still a transverse neural organization provides
a plausible precondition for such extended sensors as
well as their connection to self-induced movement.
To summarize, the SBT claims that nerve nets origi-
nated as a new mechanism by which Pantin surfaces
could be more intricately and flexibly patterned to
accommodate efficient motility at larger bodily scales.
At a fundamental level nerve nets are fitted to spatial
patterning and to accommodating spatially patterned
feedback. Early nerve nets dynamically bonded the
multicellular organism into an integrated behavioral
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system that could act as a single unit. They first supple-
mented, but eventually dominated precursor (myo)e-
pithelia in most animals. Importantly, on the SBT
account early nerve nets did not evolve as a clumsy way
to connect sensors to effectors, but, rather, as a dedi-
cated structure for organizing a new kind of effector.
Nerve nets later evolved special-purpose optimizations
or adaptations and eventually developed centralization.
6 Conclusions
Our aim was to question the input–output interpreta-
tion for basic nervous systems—nerve nets—and to
develop the outlines of an alternative interpretation of
what nervous systems do. In this final section, we will
first discuss how the SBT is different from the input–
output interpretation, and subsequently position the
SBT in a wider conceptual domain, provided by the
cognitive, neural and behavioral sciences.
6.1 An alternative for the input–output
interpretation
The SBT offers a genuinely new conceptual approach
for understanding nervous systems at a whole systems
level. Starting with the most primitive neural organiza-
tions—proto-neural myoepithelia and nerve nets—we
argue that both are characterized by connections trans-
verse to the standard sensor-effector direction and
evolved their characteristics to bind the many cellular
units of muscle sheets together into a unitary system.
Nervous systems are in this view not organized
around—or rather between—sensors and effectors. They
are themselves a precondition for both extended con-
tractile effectors as well as multicellular sensory arrays.
Myoepithelia and nerve nets can still be interpreted
as input–output devices. However, now that an alterna-
tive is available it can be seen more clearly that the
notions of input and output are of limited use to under-
stand how they function. An input–output framework
highlights a temporal sequence, while the notion of
‘‘output’’ refers to a generalized functional abstraction
that is not intrinsically tied to any particular physical
organization. This notion does not reflect the activity
patterns across a Pantin surface. Myoepithelia and
nerve nets send activation across the effector, not to the
effector. Pantin patterning refers to the spatial and
physical organization of patterns across a multicellular
tissue of a specific size and constitution that is part of a
particular bodily organization. In contrast to ‘‘output’’,
this refers to a biophysical form of organization. Such
patterns constitute a physical domain that can be read-
ily investigated, both experimentally and by modeling.
Thus, while an input–output interpretation casts the
operation of basic nervous systems in terms of abstract,
computational functions, the SBT draws it as a
producer of complex but concrete dynamical patterns
of activation.
We have stressed from the beginning that the SBT
provides a conceptual reinterpretation of nervous system
functioning. Nevertheless, the SBT is at heart an
empirical thesis. As an empirical proposal, the SBT
requires much more research and detail before it can be
accepted. However, the SBT makes it thinkable that we
may need to reinterpret nervous systems operation at a
fundamental systems level. While the proposal is as yet
succinct when it comes to sketching the trees, it does
provide a totally new outlook on the forest.
6.2 Theoretical connections
So far, we limited our discussion to basic nerve nets.
Still, we believe the resulting reinterpretation has poten-
tial relevance for a much wider domain, indeed, several
domains.
Nervous systems: Foremost, the SBT is relevant for
clarifying what nervous systems are. Above, we used
physiological criteria to differentiate nervous systems
from other systems or tissues. The SBT provides a
systems-based interpretation that sets up a clear target
for ongoing discussions on brain-like structures in non-
animals such as plants (Balusˇka et al., 2006) and artifi-
cial ‘‘nervous systems’’ in robotics (Beer, 1997; Froese
& Ziemke, 2009).
Biological theories on the evolution of nervous sys-
tems: While the SBT is itself not tied to detailed phylo-
genetic scenarios, it does provide important additional
constraints on such scenarios by clarifying the way in
which early nervous systems can have operated.
Neuroscience: The SBT has close links to theories of
motor control that focus on neural circuits for move-
ment (e.g., Orlovsky, Deliagina, & Grillner, 1999; Stein,
Grillner, Selverston, & Stuart, 1997), to neuroethologi-
cal studies of animal behavior (e.g., Greenspan, 2007;
Marder, 1998), to dynamic approaches within neu-
roscience (e.g., Buzsa´ki, 2006), and to modeling
approaches within neuroscience (e.g., Chiel & Beer,
1997; Ijspeert, Crespi, & Cabelguen, 2005) and embo-
died cognition (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007). However, the
SBT is not a thesis about motor control or behavior but
a conceptualization of whole nervous systems—albeit
basic ones—in which enabling motility is the founda-
tion of nervous system operation. This involves a reap-
praisal of the motility-related domain itself, of the
theoretical relevance of basic nervous systems, as well
as new targets for modeling approaches, e.g., (myo)e-
pithelia, nerve nets and Pantin surfaces.
Embodied cognition: The field of embodied cognition
has yet to develop a generally accepted interpretation
of the fundamental notion of embodiment itself (e.g.
Clark, 2008; Thompson, 2007). The SBT provides a
new way to understand embodiment, in the examples
typically invoked in the field, by casting it in terms of a
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dynamic, motile entity unified through transverse pat-
terning by a nervous system.
Animal behavior: There remains a wide spread ten-
dency to look at behavior in terms of reactions to stimuli,
or tasks that can be described and accomplished without
reference to any species in particular. The skin brain pro-
posal casts animal behavior as a dynamical phenotype,
necessarily tied to the species or class of animals under
consideration. Sherrington once observed that ‘‘posture
follows movement like a shadow’’ (Stuart, 2005). We
would like to stress that dynamically changing body pos-
ture is a precondition for all task-oriented animal beha-
vior. Animal behavior is a part of animal organization.
Central nervous systems: Applying the SBT to centra-
lized nervous systems, and ultimately the human brain,
will be an important challenge that we cannot address
here. However, the very existence of an alternative for the
input–output interpretation at a basic level warrants a
more general scrutiny of input–output thinking as the
general description of nervous systems. It is an open ques-
tion to what extent centralized forms are really different
from skin brains and the information processing interpre-
tation will need to be argued for rather than assumed.
Obviously, these potential implications of the SBT
remain tentative at present and establishing their valid-
ity is beyond the present paper. However, even naming
these tentative theoretical connections shows that the
exotic domain of basic nerve nets can itself be taken as
a matter of central concern for the behavioral, cognitive
and neurosciences, simply because of such potential
repercussions. It will matter a great deal for all these
fields how the study of basic nervous systems develops.
Notes
1. The term ‘‘Coelenterate’’ is no longer in use.
Coelenterates have now been separated into the phyla
Cnidaria and Ctenophora.
2. These organisms are modern and do have nervous sys-
tems. Neither the evolution of nervous systems, nor the
evolution of muscle-based movement ever led to the dis-
appearance of cilia or movement by cilia. Cilia remain a
very effective form of animal locomotion in many circum-
stances and are for example also lining the trachea of our
own lungs to sweep out mucus and dirt.
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